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PARTICIPATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION: ISSUES, 
THEORY, AND NEW EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA 
 




This paper examines the relationship between community participation and the 
efficacy of interventions designed to reduce poverty. We develop some simple analytics 
that are used to structure a review of the extant literature and motivate the analysis of the 
impact of participation on the efficacy of public works interventions in South Africa. 
These analytics suggest that because communities possess informational advantages 
unavailable to outsiders, community participation offers the prospect of lowering the cost 
of antipoverty interventions. In cases where the outcomes of interventions are difficult to 
measure, community participation is attractive because it is more likely to produce a set 
of outcomes actually desired by the community. However, this observation should not be 
taken to imply that these outcomes are desired by all members of the community, nor by 
those who finance these interventions. These arguments are supported both by a review 
of the extant literature and also by a multivariate analysis of the impact of community 
participation on public works projects in South Africa. We find that increasing 
community participation lowers the ratio of project to local wages, increases the labor 
intensity of projects that provide community buildings, roads or sewers, and lowers the 
cost of creating employment and of transferring funds to poor individuals. We find no 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are three broad perspectives to deciding which policies, programs, and 
projects to use to reduce poverty in developing countries. One focuses on the specific 
technical features of these interventions, i.e., what activities will have the largest effects 
on reducing poverty. A second focuses on the political economy of poverty alleviation, 
examining the interplay of politics and economics in shaping approaches to poverty 
reduction. Technical and, to a lesser extent, political economy approaches were featured 
in the 1990 World Development Report on poverty. A third approach is through the 
analysis of institutional arrangements. At one level, “Institutions are a set of rules, 
compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the 
behavior of individuals” (North 1981, 201–02). In this context, institutions can be 
considered at a variety of levels of aggregation, including constitutional order and 
normative behavioral codes (Feeny 1988). They can also be seen as organizational 
structures, systems of nonmarket relations (Van Arkadie 1989).  
This paper examines the relationship between a specific institutional arrangement, 
community or beneficiary participation, and the efficacy of interventions designed to 
reduce poverty. Chambers (1974) and Cohen and Uphoff (1980) provided early 
statements of its potential and it is mentioned in the 1994 and 1997 World Development 
Reports (World Bank 1994, 1997). Community participation is now is a rapidly growing 
area of discourse among donor agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
development practitioners, a discourse complemented by increasing documentation of its 
impact (Narayan 1998 provides an especially useful overview).  
Our contribution is threefold. First, we outline some simple analytics of 
participation and poverty reduction. We use these to guide a structured review of this 
burgeoning literature and argue that beneficiary participation is essentially a form of 
decentralization. As the public finance literature makes clear, this perspective offers two 
advantages. First, the active involvement of beneficiaries may lower the informational 2 
costs associated with antipoverty interventions. Second, beneficiary participation offers 
the potential for the design and implementation of interventions that reflect the 
preferences of the population they are designed to assist. However, there are also 
potential drawbacks. Although beneficiary participation has the potential to lower the 
costs of implementing interventions, it does not necessarily follow that beneficiaries are 
always the lowest-cost providers. Second, since communities are rarely homogeneous, it 
is inevitable that interventions will disproportionately benefit one element of the 
community. It is thus important to examine whose preferences are being voiced.  
Finally, we present a case study of public works in South Africa. Using a unique 
source of data, we examine the impact of increased community participation on the 
success of public works projects. The data come from a study of public works programs 
in South Africa’s Western Cape Province, conducted between 1996 and 1998 by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at University of Cape Town. This study 
collected project-level quantitative and qualitative data on, among other things, diverse 
institutional arrangements between government, communities, and the private sector; 
types of community participation; and project outcomes.  
Results of the qualitative studies and descriptive statistics on this data are reported 
in Adato et al. (1999a). This paper develops a multivariate analysis to examine the impact 
of different levels and types of community participation on a number of indicators 
reflecting program objectives. These are the ability of these projects to utilize publicly 
provided funds in a cost-efficient manner (the amount spent to create one day of 
employment; the cost to the government of transferring funds to the poor; and the level of 
cost overruns), the extent to which project benefits flow to individuals in the form of 
wages and training, and the extent to which these projects target particular groups within 
these localities. We have considered the impact of both de jure and de facto authority in 
terms of their direct effect, their impact conditional on the type of asset being created, 
and variations within these broad categories.  3 
Two issues underlie our estimation strategy: the appropriate definition of 
participation; and the need to take into account a number of econometric concerns, 
notably nonrandom program placement and unobserved selectivity effects that might 
influence both project outcomes and the likelihood of community participation. It turns 
out that the former issue is extremely important and the latter relatively unimportant. Our 
detailed knowledge of the manner in which these projects operated, together with the 
statistical analysis undertaken by Adato and Haddad (1999), indicate no correlation 
between the localities in which projects were sited and observable characteristics of those 
communities. We used measures of community fractionalization—such as the extent of 
racial and political diversity—to predict the likelihood of community participation in 
these projects. These variables demonstrate strong associations with the likelihood of 
participation while generally having no direct impact on project outcomes. 
By contrast, how participation is measured is particularly important. In general, 
measures of de jure participation are less strongly associated with project outcomes than 
are measures of de facto participation. We find that de facto participation lowers the ratio 
of project to local wages (provided selectivity biases are taken into account); increases 
the labor intensity of projects that provide community buildings, roads, or sewers; and 
lowers the cost of creating employment and of transferring funds to poor individuals. 
There is weak evidence to suggest that where communities advise but do not make 
decisions, the percentage of employment going to women rises. We find no evidence that 
community participation increases cost overruns or the ratio of training to employment 
created, an exception to the former being the case of environmental improvement 
activities (where the effect is not especially well measured). In these projects, de facto 
community participation is generally associated with improved project cost-effectiveness 





2. PARTICIPATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
In this section, we examine the issues underlying the role of community 
participation in antipoverty interventions. We lay out a simple framework to discuss the 
analytics of participation and poverty reduction. We identify the main trade-off as being 
between the way in which different modes of delivery vary in the costs of intervening and 
the design of objectives. Trade-offs arise when the most efficient provider happens not to 
care most about the poor.  
 
FRAMEWORK 
Our simplified framework is based on the three main types of actor involved in 
the delivery of antipoverty interventions: financiers, providers, and beneficiaries.  
 
1.  The primary role of financiers is to provide funds for the intervention. Good 
examples are multilateral and bilateral donors, ministries of finance and NGOs.  
2.  The main role of providers is to implement interventions. For example, Morrison 
(1998, 222) describes officers of the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) as “managers of contracts rather than development projects.” Providers 
may be line ministries, autonomous government agencies, private firms, or NGOs. 
In many cases, the providers and financiers are one and the same. Depending on 
context, financiers or providers may initiate or design interventions. 
3.  Beneficiaries comprise communities, households, and individuals who receive the 
benefits of the intervention. This group could be quite narrowly targeted or quite 
diverse.  
 
These actors may take on more than one role. An NGO may be both a financier 
and a provider. As described by Ostrom (1996), farmers in the community management 
of irrigation structures in Nepal are the financiers (they contributing to defray the cost of 5 
maintaining and operating these structures), the providers (they operate the structures), 
and the beneficiaries. Seen in this context, participation in antipoverty interventions is a 
process whereby beneficiaries become involved in provision and possibly finance.  
One key assumption of this model is that poverty alleviation projects are deemed 
to have multiple objectives. This contrasts with much of the literature on poverty 
alleviation policy, which focuses on one-dimensional objectives such as program 
generosity.  
In practice, interventions designed to reduce poverty are highly multidimensional. 
For example, a public works scheme in a rural area may be designed to raise income of a 
target group, e.g., women or the “poorest of the poor,” create a physical asset of lasting 
value; and create community “capacity” or “empowerment.” A microcredit intervention 
might seek to provide credit to the landless for income generating activities, while 
reaching a large number of households in a short period of time, maintaining high rates of 
repayment, and minimizing administrative costs. 
Each of the parties listed above has preferences over the outcomes resulting from 
an intervention. For heuristic purposes, suppose that there are just two outcomes, denoted 
by z1 and z2—this will suffice to make the main points of interest. Given a pair of realized 
objectives, we denote the outcome that accrues to the poor as B(z1, z2). We assume that 
B(z1, z2) is increasing in both arguments; they are measured so that more of both z1 and z2 
are considered to be a good thing. We think of the benefit function as the kind of 
conventional objective function studied in the literature on antipoverty interventions. For 
example, a standard poverty measure in the FGT class could fit this, where z1 is the 
poverty line and z2 is the extent of targeting across different subgroups of the poor. 
While we assume that beneficiaries’ outcomes can be valued in the standard 
objective way, this is not the case for the financiers and providers. We assume that they 
can be driven by particular missions to design interventions in particular ways. This is 
captured by giving them some explicit benefit from having the intervention designed in a 
particular way. Good examples of these private benefits can be found in the literature on 
incentive structures within institutions that have mandates to deliver interventions that 6 
assist the poor. These stress the importance of both monetary, or extrinsic, incentives as 
well as intrinsic factors such as “pride in one’s work.”
1 Within Bolivia’s Emergency 
Social Fund—designed to create minimum wage jobs in the construction of community 
assets—both extrinsic (promotion based on performance in implementing projects that 
poor people requested at reasonable cost, and generating jobs) and intrinsic (the “glamour 
of serving the poor,” see Klitgaard 1997), norms were used to ensure that individuals 
within this agency worked towards these goals. Tendler and Freedheim’s (1994) account 
of a successful preventive health program in the state of Ceará, Brazil, provides a second 
example. In their narrative, a key feature that facilitated the success of this work was that 
project staff, who were all public servants, received a number of extrinsic rewards, 
relating to enhanced status both professionally and within the community. Lam (1996) 
notes that, in the context of local irrigation authorities in Taiwan, responsibility for good 
performance is “supported not simply by bureaucratic rules but also by norms and social 
sanctions” (Lam 1996, 1050). Conversely, there may also be powerful extrinsic 
motivations that discourage individuals within financier and provider entities from 
supporting activities that beneficiaries desire. Ostrom’s (1996) review of incentives and 
development notes that professional pride represents an important motivator for engineers 
involved in designing irrigation works, a finding echoed by Adato (1999a) in their 
analysis of public works in South Africa. In both cases, this discourages these actors from 
designing works in keeping with the preferences of local communities.  
 
Fk(z1 , z2 ) = β fk(z1 , z2 ) + (1 – β )B(z1 , z2 ) , 
 
where fk(z1 , z2 ) is the “private” benefit accruing to the financier and β  is the weight 
given to this private benefit. Indexing by k recognizes that there are different kinds of 
                                                 
1 Ostrom, Lam, and Lee (1994) and Ostrom (1996) discuss this extensively in the context of state 
management of irrigation structures in Nepal. Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna (1998) provide further examples 
from a number of rural development projects. 7 
financiers who may each have different objectives. In what follows, we work for 
simplicity with the case where there is a unitary financier. It will not affect the main 
points that we are making. 
The objective function for provider j can be written as 
 
Pj (z1 , z2 ) = α j pj(z1 , z2 ) + (1 – α j)B(z1 , z2 ) , 
 
where pj(z1 , z2 ) is the “private” benefit accruing to the provider Pj and α j is the weight 
given to this private benefit.
2 One possible provider is the community and it will prove 
helpful to denote the objective function of the community as provider as PCP and the 
private weight for the community as provider as α CP . 
To fix ideas, we now consider two extreme cases: unified provider-financier 
provision and a split between the financier and the provider where the community now 
gets to design the project. Exactly how this will work will depend upon what we assume 
about the kinds of agreements that can be written between the community and the 
financier in the case of community provision being considered. At one extreme is the 
case where the financier can specify and enforce a very detailed agreement with 
community about how it will run the intervention. In that case, the community becomes 
effectively disempowered in specifying objectives, and acts as a “perfect” agent, 
providing cost advantages without distorting the financier’s objectives. 
                                                 
2 Note that this assumes that financiers and providers are homogeneous, which in reality may not be the 
case. The donor who is acting as a financier might consist of a project leader who is interested in 
maximizing prestige; middle managers anxious to protect their budgets; and lower level functionaries 
interested in promotion. Further, each actor may be accountable to a number of constituencies. For 
example, an engineer within a government public works department who is responsible for providing 
drinking water to a locality may be answerable to four different groups. These could include her superiors 
within the bureaucracy, a professional organization that accredits and monitors her professional conduct, 
local politicians seeking to maximize the benefits flowing to their constituents, and the intended 
beneficiaries of the intervention. 8 
At the other extreme, we could suppose that casting the community in the role as 
a provider gives it complete autonomy in program design so that its preferences over the 
objectives are decisive. Of course, in actuality most cases are situated between the two 
extremes. Our next task is to consider what might happen in a number of specific cases 
using our model to generate a simple diagrammatic approach. 
In every case, we are interested in the answers to two main questions: 
 
1.  How would a switch to community finance change the choice of program 
objectives? 
2.  Will benefits necessarily increase from community participation? 
 
The answers to these questions will depend upon the trade-off between program 
design and cost advantages. Note that even though communities’ information and 
enforcement advantages are likely to give them a lower cost of provision, certain 
incentive problems may arise when there is separation of finance and provision. This can 
arise in situations where the cost of providing support to the poor depends upon 
investments made by the provider. If contracts between the provider and financier are 
complete (binding and specifying all possible contingencies), then there are no particular 
difficulties—the types and nature of investments can be contracted upon up-front. 
However, in the more likely world of contractual incompleteness, there is a possible 
problem of hold-up when more than one party is involved. For example, a financier who 
does not like the way a project is being executed can threaten to withdraw finance. In 
such circumstances, this will tend to blunt the incentives of providers to invest in the 
project. This can create a further trade-off between unified financier-provider schemes 
with those where the provider and the financier are from different institutions. Thus, even 
though communities may be more efficient, this may not be realized in practice. 
 9 
THE COMMUNITY AS PROVIDER WHEN OUTCOMES ARE PERFECTLY 
ENFORCEABLE 
We begin by considering the “complete contracts” case, where the power to 
specify objectives remains with the financier after community participation. We assume 
that enforcement of program objectives is without cost to the financier, which, while not 
very realistic, is a useful first step in identifying the forces that shape how community 
participation works.
3  
Where differences in objectives are irrelevant, the only issue then in determining 
the effect of community participation relates to cost advantages or disadvantages. The 
assumption that different providers will be able to intervene at different costs is natural. 
There are two main sources of cost differences—information and enforcement. Some 
providers may be better able to identify particular groups of poor and target resources to 
them. Others may find it easier to threaten punishments if the poor do not follow a 
particular course of action. We denote the cost of providing z1 and z2 for provider j as 
Cj(z1 , z2 ). In particular, let the cost of community participation be CCP(z1, z2). In the case 
where the financier is also the provider, the cost function would be Cf(z1, z2). Many 
advocates of community participation do so because they argue that communities are 
more cost-effective, so we work with the case where
4  
 
CCP(z1, z2) < Cf(z1, z2) for all (z1, z2) . 
 
There is plenty of evidence on the cost differences between difference types of 
project management. First, there may be interventions where knowledge of local 
conditions is especially important and where the cost of the acquisition of such 
knowledge by outsiders is high. For example, developing irrigation systems requires 
                                                 
3 The following case would also be relevant if the financier and the provider had identical objectives. 
4 This assumes that the community is better at all activities, whereas it is quite possible that the community 
is only better at attaining some of the objectives. This would naturally be the case where some of the 
activities benefit from scale economies. 10 
detailed knowledge of local factors such as soil conditions, water velocity, and shifting 
watercourses, all of which external planners and engineers often lack (Ascher and Healy 
1990; Chambers 1988; Ostrom, Lam, and Lee 1994; Uphoff 1986). Manikutty (1998) 
notes that in the context of water and sanitation projects, community involvement is 
important in ensuring that projects are sited where they are most likely to be used. Adato 
(1999b) found that in public works projects in South Africa, communities had knowledge 
about local conditions such as safety hazards and vandalism, with relevance for road 
design. 
Second, community participation may reduce the likelihood of moral hazard or 
adverse selection problems. For example, for a public works project in which a daily 
wage payment is made, involvement by the community in the hiring of labor may 
increase the likelihood that the “deserving poor” receive employment, while those with a 
propensity to shirk are excluded. In the Village Infrastructure Project in Indonesia and 
Social Funds implemented in Malawi and Eritrea, community groups were given the 
authority to manage financial resources, as they were seen to be particularly careful in 
monitoring expenses (Narayan 1998). However, Adato et al. (1999) found that South 
African communities had their own ideas about who was the most deserving poor, or 
otherwise deserving of jobs, which did not coincide with more generally accepted criteria 
of targeted poverty programs. 
Third, communities may be better at verifying that activities related to 
interventions take place. A good example relates to the provision of education. An 
important input is the quality of instruction provided by the teacher. An outsider could 
have difficulty monitoring such performance. By contrast, parents often have better 
information on teachers’ activities. In this context, work by King and Ozler (1998) on the 
impact of Nicaragua’s school autonomy reforms, is instructive. Like many other Latin 
American countries, for many years the provision of education in Nicaragua was highly 
centralized, from funding to teacher selection and pay to curriculum design (Morley and 
Silva 1994). Beginning in 1993, Nicaraguan public schools could become autonomous 
and legally vested with many of the features of private schools. King and Ozler found 11 
that students attending schools with de facto autonomy (a measure based on the 
proportion of decisions made by the school on teacher staffing) achieved better test 
scores than students in schools where no local autonomy was granted or where autonomy 
was only de jure. These findings are based on a regression analysis that controls for 
student, household, school, and locality effects. The literature on the management of 
irrigation structures also stresses the importance of the ongoing monitoring of these 
systems, and the advantages that local communities have in this regard. 
The conservation of natural resources such as wildlife, watersheds, local forests, 
and grazing lands is an example where local participants have an informational 
advantage. Agrawal and Gibson (1999), Ashby, Knapp, and Ravnborg (1998), and 
Caldecott and Lutz (1998) argue that the maintenance of these resources requires 
considerable local knowledge and inputs. Additionally, ongoing monitoring is needed to 
ensure that rules regarding the use or protection of these resources are enforced.  
Fourth, communities may have the ability to lower costs using methods that are 
not available to outsiders. A much-cited example is the construction of a sanitation 
network by the residents of Orangi, a poor urban neighborhood in Karachi, Pakistan. In 
the absence of external funding, the design of the sewer network was strongly 
conditioned by the need to keep costs as low as possible. This served as the impetus to 
the design of a number of lower cost components (Ghafoor 1987). Communities 
operating the Social Funds in Malawi were able to convince participants to accept lower 
wages than those officially sanctioned, with the savings being devoted to the construction 
of additional physical assets (Narayan 1998).
5 
                                                 
5 Note, however, that all costs are not necessarily lowered when beneficiaries have increased involvement 
in the design and implementation of interventions. Other providers may offer cost advantages in other 
areas. For example, liaising with a number of communities will carry higher administrative costs to the 
financier than contracting with a single provider. A large NGO or private firm may be able to benefit from 
economies of scale or superior management skills. These concerns are common to the literature on both 
decentralization and participation (see De Groot 1988; World Bank 1994; and Manikutty 1998). But one 
must be careful about this caveat as it is based on an implicit assumption of decentralization of all 
activities, or put another way, pure decentralization. There is no a priori reason why this would need to be 
so. 12 
Klitgaard’s (1997) description of Bolivia’s Emergency Social Fund provides a 
good example of how antipoverty interventions can be made especially effective via a 
mix of centralized and decentralized activities. 
 
The ESF set up a process that asked the communities, working with the 
private sector constructors of schools, roads, sewers, and so forth, to 
submit proposals that were vetted centrally. …The centralized information 
process included estimates of costs of projects such as rural roads and 
schools, so that officials could spot proposals with outrageous estimates. 
…As an effective program of decentralization it empowered communities, 
not only through communities saying what they wanted, but through their 
helping to build what they wanted. Decentralization worked because 
centralization worked. The ESF centralized the appropriate things: 
information, negotiations with international donors, and incentive systems 
for ESF employees. This in turn enabled it to decentralize the design and 
construction of rural projects (pp. 1965, 1967). 
 
In the context of natural resource interventions, Agrawal and Gibson (1999), 
Ashby, Knapp, and Ravnborg (1998), and Caldecott and Lutz (1998) note that the impact 
of participatory arrangements can be enhanced when outside agencies provide specialist 
advice. Development of the Indo-German watershed in Maharashtra, India, is offered as 
an example of this (Ashby, Knapp, and Ravnborg 1998). In this context, an external 
agency also plays an important role where there are interjurisdictional considerations. 
Lam’s (1996) detailed description of the management of irrigation facilities in Taiwan, 
regarded by some as the most efficient system in the world, provides an example of a 
successful mix of centralization and beneficiary participation in the delivery of water.  
We now use our simple analytical framework to consider what happens when the 
financier can choose community participation while retaining the ability to determine 
program objectives. In the following diagrams, the axes are the levels of the two 13 
objectives chosen in the programs. Our assumption that the community is a lower cost 
provider is reflected in the location of the two cost curves. In terms of the figures, this 
translates into the poverty objectives possibility frontiers that are drawn as convex to the 
origin. There are three benefit functions to consider—that of the beneficiaries and 
whoever controls the intervention. These can all be drawn as having indifference curves 
that we draw as convex. 
In Figure 1, we illustrate a possible status at point A that reflects the optimal 
choice of the financier. Note that the beneficiaries do not receive their maximum benefit, 
which is B. This reflects the fact that the financier may not share the beneficiaries’ 
objectives perfectly. If it did, then these two points would coincide. This figure illustrates 
very clearly the idea that there is a potential for all to gain by switching to a provider that 
can achieve both objectives at lower cost. There are points on the objectives possibility 
frontier (representing the cost function of the community) that are better for everyone. 
Figure 2 considers what would happen if the financier handed over the running of 
the project to the community and the objectives of the financier and the community 
coincide. In this case, we move from A to C. Clearly, the financier is better off as he 
secures greater levels of the objectives at lower cost. In most cases, we would also expect 
the beneficiaries to gain; and the way we have illustrated the outcome here, this is indeed 
the case. Note once again that the beneficiaries do not get their ideal outcome, even 
though they get more of every objective. 
 
THE COMMUNITY AS PROVIDER WHEN THE PROVIDER HAS COMPLETE 
CONTROL OVER PROGRAM OBJECTIVES  
We now consider what would happen when community participation results in a 
provider who has discretion over the choice of objectives in a poverty alleviation 
program. This is a natural case to consider given the heterogeneous nature of program 
objectives and the extent to which they can be measured and monitored. 
 14 
Outcome possibility frontier for fixed budget























C   Implementation delegated to community; financier controls objectives of
intervention
D  Implementation delegated to community; “community” + “poor’s” 
preferences coincide; community has complete autonomy  15 
Consider, for example, the monitoring of a credit program. Lending records 
provide an easy means of monitoring disbursement levels and repayment rates. By 
contrast, ensuring that credit is reaching the intended beneficiaries can be accomplished 
only with significantly higher monitoring costs. Other objectives of antipoverty 
interventions, such as “community empowerment” are even more difficult to measure. 
An additional issue is how weights should be attached to these different objectives. The 
key issue is not the number of objectives, their diversity, or the difficulty in assigning 
weights. Rather, it is the combination of all these factors. In the case of rural road 
construction, for example, one could imagine two types of projects, one that is highly 
labor intensive but produces a road that needs frequent rebuilding, or one that is more 
capital intensive but produces a road that is longer lasting. In principle, one could 
calculate the transfer of funds flowing directly to the poor under both schemes as well as 
heroically imputing a value associated with different rates of depreciation. This would 
require making assumptions about how long the road lasts under both approaches, the 
return to the presence of the well-constructed road both generally and to the poor, the 
discount rate, and weights that one would attach to income transfers to the poor and not-
poor. But even if one could make all such calculations, other criteria (such as “increased 
community capacity”) would remain unmeasured. 
To illustrate these ideas in our framework, we begin by taking an extreme 
incomplete contracts case where the provider has complete control over the program’s 
objectives. Formally, it will choose the levels of the objectives to maximize its benefits 
subject to the costs of provision. We maintain throughout the assumption from the last 
section that community participation lowers the cost of intervention. We also focus on the 
central case of interest where the community’s preferences diverge from the financier’s 
preferences over the design of the intervention. 
Our first case, also illustrated in Figure 2, shows that where implementation is 
delegated to the community, where the community’s preferences coincide with those of 
the beneficiaries, and where the community has complete autonomy, we obtain outcome 
D. But Figure 3 paints a less rosy picture. This is where the community’s preferences for  16 












E   Implementation delegated to community: “community” + “poor’s”
preferences diverge; community has complete autonomy
 
 
program objectives diverge even further from the beneficiaries’ than do those of the 
provider. In this case, we get an outcome at point E. This would arise if the community 
valued objective 2 a great deal more than do the beneficiaries. This could occur where 
local elites “capture” the intervention and where these elites greatly value z2, whereas the 
poor value z1. In this case, the beneficiaries would actually prefer to have the higher cost 
financier design the intervention. Note, however, that the financier still prefers to have 
the intervention managed by the community since the cost advantage is not outweighed 
by the preference divergence in this case. 
There is much discussion of how shifts to more decentralized forms of project 
management change program objectives, whether for better or for worse. Ostrom (1995) 
provides one example of this in the context of self-managed irrigation works in Nepal. 
She notes that all farmers, even the very poor, are expected to contribute labor to the 
upkeep of irrigation works. Although this might appear inequitable, this “sweat equity” is 
a means by which these individuals maintain their claims on the water flowing through 17 
these irrigation canals. Such claims are important, as these farmers are typically located 
at the tail-end of these canals and are therefore most affected when other farmers take 
more than their share of water. In other words, community participation may be an 
important means of ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits, as contributions of 
inputs give individuals a voice in how resources are used. A desirable distribution of 
benefits is often used to explain the early success of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE project. In 
this project, local communities were given considerable scope to manage local wildlife 
resources, including the right to collect revenues from hunting licenses. 
By contrast, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) note that the natural resource literature 
occasionally mythologizes the notion of communities as homogeneous bodies with 
shared interests, when in fact they may be considerably more heterogeneous. Although 
the work by Ostrom, Lam, and Lee (1994) and Ostrom (1996) on self-managed irrigation 
schemes emphasizes the equitable distribution of water among participating farmers, such 
an analysis tells us nothing about the impact on nonparticipants in these localities. 
Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (1997) note that criteria for membership in these 
irrigation associations exclude women, to their disadvantage. In a different context, 
Whitehead (1990) makes a similar point, arguing that women often refuse to provide 
labor to—or participate in—agricultural development projects because they perceive that 
the benefits of this project will only accrue to male household members.
6 In Western 
Cape province, South Africa, the high level of conflict that characterized many 
community-run projects (Adato 1999b) testifies to the heterogeneous nature of 
“communities.”  
The recognition of this problem suggests that a benevolent financier cannot 
simplistically assume that contracting provision of an antipoverty intervention to the 
community will necessarily result in the desired outcomes. One way of addressing this 
                                                 
6 We have observed a similar phenomenon in northern Mali. A reputable multilateral donor was willing to 
lend the capital and provide the technical assistance for the construction of irrigation works in an area 
characterized by low and intermittent rainfall. Local villagers were expected to provide unpaid labor. They 
refused, in part because the distribution of benefits was unclear. Narayan (1998) provides a similar example 
in the context of the Orissa Social Forestry project. 18 
problem, suggested by Narayan (1998), is that community groups should be required to 
take the initiative in becoming part of a project rather than financiers initiating the 
selection of these localities. She writes: 
 
The single most important self-selection is to institute a significant 
financial or organizational contribution up-front before any project outputs 
are delivered. Many projects now require community groups to enter 
contracts and sign documents that detail mutual responsibility. These are 
useful only to the extent that people understand what they are signing and 
when enforcement mechanisms exist on both sides (community and 
agency) to keep the other party accountable (p. 113). 
 
Community self-selection and up-front contributions are a hallmark of many 
successful rural development projects (Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna 1998). But this raises 
another danger, that better organized and wealthier communities may benefit 
disproportionately from increased emphasis on participation. This echoes another debate 
prominent in the decentralization literature, namely over its consequences for distribution 
across communities (Prud’homme 1995). However, adverse consequences across 
localities are by no means inevitable. Klitgaard (1997) notes that additional technical 
assistance can be provided to communities lacking capacity. Narayan (1998) suggests 
that in such circumstances, projects be divided into small, “doable” segments, 
encouraging communities to build on success.
7 
THE COMMUNITY AS PROVIDER WHEN THE FINANCIER HAS PARTIAL 
CONTROL OVER PROGRAM OBJECTIVES  
In practice, the assumption that we made in the last section, that the financier has 
no influence at all on the community’s choice of objectives is too extreme. In practice, 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) find in experimental studies that when past common 
experience is positive, current output tends to be high. 19 
there are a number of measures taken to affect the nature of more decentralized forms of 
poverty alleviation programs. For example, it is often suggested that financiers such as 
governments or donors should link the remuneration of providers to measured output 
(Cook et al. 1995; Gore 1995; Inter-American Development Bank 1996; Israel 1987). 
The incentive payments described at the second part of Section 2 are an example of this. 
The measurement problems described above make this a difficult undertaking. Even if 
they could be partially resolved—along with the difficulties associated with isolating 
individual actions from truly exogenous events and the contributions of other actors
8—
three concerns remain. 
First, the fact that some components are especially difficult to measure gives rise 
to dangers regarding perverse incentives. Morris et al. (1999) consider the PLANDERO 
project, a technically well-designed intervention that sought to increase the incomes of 
the rural poor in the western region of Honduras. The project documentation specified 
criteria for targeting areas of operation and households within selected areas. However, 
an analysis of the project indicated that beneficiary areas tended to be relatively better 
off, and the most deprived areas least likely to receive assistance. Morris et al. (1999) 
adduce several reasons why this occurred. First, PLANDERO was required to meet an 
implementation schedule, defined in terms of enrollment of households into groups. 
Second, the project was required to satisfy rate-of-return criteria. Third, project 
monitoring and evaluation included components that will assess not only the speed of 
implementation but also impact among beneficiaries. Specified monitoring targets 
included: number of new groups, number of new members, farm production, and 
“economic results” for the farmer. Meeting these objectives was most easily achieved by 
working in localities close to the project headquarters or on major roads. These areas 
tended to be better off. Meeting objectives at the household level was most easily 
achieved by targeting those households that had already been past recipients of credit and 
                                                 
8 Prendergast (1999) provides numerous examples demonstrating that these problems also exist within the 
private sector. 20 
were therefore more likely to be creditworthy, and better educated households who could 
most easily grasp the concepts associated with the technologies provided by the project. 
Thus, meeting established performance requirements effectively encouraged the project 
to avoid the poorest households in this region of Honduras.
9 
Second, in the presence of imperfect information, providers might “game” the 
system. In her review of incentive schemes for state owned enterprises, Shirley (1998) 
notes that governments often had poor information on performance. Managers used their 
informational advantage to negotiate targets that were hard to monitor or easy to achieve. 
In cases where the financier uses incentive mechanisms to try to affect the choices 
made by the provider, the analysis of the issues illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 need to be 
modified, but only slightly. First, we would expect the objectives of the provider and 
financier to be closer together. Whether this is actually better for the beneficiaries will 
depend upon whether the provider or the financier’s preferences are closer to the 
beneficiaries’ payoff. Resolving agency problems between the financier and the provider 
need not benefit the poor—this would only happen if the more efficient provider has 
preferences that are more divergent from the beneficiaries’ payoff than from the 
financier’s. 
The analysis so far has been based on the relationship between a single financier 
and providers. Where there is more than one financier, incentive mechanisms such as 
“pay for performance” will have low power. Suppose several financiers seek to achieve 
some poverty-reducing intervention with multiple objectives. Each is interested in 
maximizing the achievement of one particular objective (or less restrictively, applies 
different weights to objectives). Further, suppose that they cannot act collusively.
10 As 
Dixit (1997) explains, each financier could strike a mutually beneficial deal with the 
                                                 
9 Courty and Marschke (1997) document a similar example in their assessment of the implementation of 
the U.S. Job Training Partnership Act. 
 
10 Strictly speaking, this is not a necessary condition for the argument to go through. See Dixit (1997, p. 
380). 
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provider by offering a payment in return for the provider exerting greater effort in those 
dimensions of interest to that financier, and commensurately lower effort in those 
dimensions that are of interest to other financiers. But since all financiers find it in their 
interest to act in this way, incentives are weak all round. 
Much of the literature on community participation does not clarify precisely what 
is meant by participation, nor does the public finance literature clarify what is meant by 
decentralization. In the latter, particular attention is paid to whether formal (de jure) or 
real (de facto) authority is decentralized. Formal authority is the right to decide; real 
authority is the effective control over decisions (Aghion and Tirole 1997). Why should 
this matter? In the absence of delegation of de facto decision-making power, potential 
beneficiaries are reluctant to act because of concerns that they will be subsequently 
overruled. Alternatively, central authorities may subsequently renege on commitments 
and the threat of this generates a hold-up problem.
11 Gershberg (1998) provides examples 
from the decentralization literature in Latin America consistent with these observations. 
Conversely, Oates (1995) notes that where local authorities provide services funded by a 
central body, local incentives for efficient local fiscal allocations are destroyed because 
local authorities do not bear the costs of their own actions. 
                                                 
11 Hart, Shliefer, and Vishny (1997) have identified the importance of hold-up problems to contracting for 
prisons. They consider two kinds of investments—cost reducing and quality increasing. Under public 
ownership, a bureaucrat undertakes investments and under private ownership a firm does—the government, 
which buys the final product, provides finance. Under public ownership, the government must sanction 
both cost and quality improvements. Since it owns the asset, hold-up problems are mitigated. Privatization 
worsens the hold-up problem since it is assumed that the supplier can walk away after having invested, 
leaving the government with valueless investments. However, it also creates good incentives for investment 
in cost reduction that can be undertaken without government approval. However, since quality 
improvements require the government (the buyer of the service) to approve, quality may suffer. Thus, in 
this case, the quality of the output may suffer even if the cost is reduced. Thus their analysis gives a 
somewhat different kind of underpinning to the idea that some dimensions of program design may suffer 
when a potentially more efficient arrangement is being considered. 
A different version of the hold-up problem is studied in Besley and Ghatak (1999). Their paper is 
closer in spirit to the analysis here since they begin from a situation where the financier and provider have 
different objectives. They argue that it is best to have a project managed by the party who values the 
outcome most. However, a trade-off may arise when this is not the party who is most efficient at providing 
all inputs. In this case, similar to the points being made above there is trade-off between fulfillment of 
objectives and cost reductions.  22 
There are several examples within the beneficiary participation literature that are 
consistent with these concerns. Manikutty (1998) used a structured case study approach 
to examine the experiences of water and sanitation projects in five different Indian states. 
He found that the most successful projects, in terms of utilization and maintenance of 
facilities, were those in which de facto decision-making authority was delegated over 
decisions such as the physical location of water standpoints and latrines and the 
development of organizations that would monitor and maintain these facilities. By 
contrast, a national sample survey of more than 400 hand pumps in Zimbabwe found that 
applying microscopic rules (such as how deep the community was required to dig) 
deterred community participation, local initiative, and problem solving (Cleaver 1990 
reported in Narayan 1998). Already noted is the finding by King and Ozler (1997) that 
test scores only improved where local communities were granted de facto autonomy. 
There was no difference between student in schools where no local autonomy was 
granted and where autonomy was only de jure. In the context of the CAMPFIRE project, 
Caldecott and Lutz (1998) noted that, “As wildlife resources in Zimbabwe came to 
generate local revenues for the CAMPFIRE districts, pressures grew to use them in ways 
that relieved central government of its spending responsibilities.” This represented a 
change in a commitment made to these communities that these revenues would not crowd 
out central government expenditures. In case studies in South Africa, members of 
community-based committees that were formerly designated participants in project 
management (for the sake of capacity building) expressed their frustration at consultants 
and government officials who resisted their participation in financial matters, skilled 
tasks and decisions apart from those related to problems with workers and the community 
(Adato 1999b). 
Moore and Joshi (1999) argue that community participation is more likely to be 
forthcoming when the financier has established a credible reputation for trust and 
reliability; in other words, when the financier can take steps to reduce the uncertainty 
regarding these activities. Such considerations suggest that the focus that many financier 
organizations place on community participation may miss the mark. What may really 23 
matter are the incentive structures within these entities. As Narayan (1998, p. 110) 
observes, “Indicators of success send important signals to staff about program priorities. 
If community involvement, the number of women or the poor reached, and the number of 
systems functioning are not reflected in indicators of success, there is little incentive for 
staff to change their way of doing things to reach these goals.”
12 
CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We begin with a caveat. Virtually all the evidence cited here that views 
beneficiary participation in a positive light is drawn from case studies. They spawn a 
wide range of interventions: public works, irrigation, education, the provision of water 
and sanitation, and the conservation of natural resources. These are clearly of enormous 
value in highlighting the various elements subsumed within the notion of participation 
and have done much to place this near the forefront of dialogue on development. But case 
studies also have limitations. It is uncertain whether the correlation between participation 
and outcomes reflects a causal link or the impact of other factors. Only three studies 
appear to control for some of these considerations, King and Ozler (1998); Isham, 
Narayan, and Pritchett (1995); and Isham and Kahkonen (1999). We have already 
discussed the King and Ozler paper; here we briefly note the results of these other 
contributions. 
Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett (1995) undertake a multivariate analysis of the 
impact of participation on the performance of rural water supply performance. An 
indicator of project success was constructed using subjective ex post facto assessments by 
two independent readers. “Participation was scored on a continuum, progressing from 
information sharing, to more in-depth consultation, to shared decision making, to control 
over decision making” (Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett 1995). They find that controlling 
for the potential endogeneity of participation and a number of other country, locality, and 
project characteristics, that participation increased this subjective measure of 
                                                 
12 See Moore and Joshi (1999) for further discussion. 24 
performance. An especially attractive feature of their work is the attempt to control for 
the endogeneity of participation. However, they consider only a single composite 
outcome and do not distinguish between de jure and de facto authority. Isham and 
Kahkonen (1999) examine the effectiveness of community-based water projects in 
Central Java. An attractive feature of this work is that they control for other relevant 
locality community characteristics, the potential endogeneity of community participation, 
examine a number of outcomes, and distinguish between de jure and de facto authority. 
They find that, “in villages with high levels of social capital—in particular with active 
village groups and associations—household participation is likely to be high and 
monitoring mechanisms are more likely to be in place” (p. 53). They also find that 
“Village leaders and outsiders do not necessarily represent the preferences of households: 
household participation in service design and decision-making led to different—typically 
more expensive and convenient—water technology choices in Central Java” (p. 52).  
Mindful of this, we note that one instrumental benefit of beneficiary participation 
lies in the prospect of reducing the cost of providing antipoverty interventions. This is 
likely to occur where knowledge of local conditions is especially important, moral hazard 
or adverse selection concerns play a role, or verification of actions is needed. Further, 
communities may have ways of lowering costs that are unavailable to outsiders. We also 
note that, akin to the problems associated with pure decentralization, devolving all 
aspects of the implementation may not be desirable. There is evidence that suggests that 
interventions work best when their implementation is characterized by a mix of 
centralization and decentralization. 
The instrumental case for beneficiary participation is further strengthened when it 
is acknowledged that the objectives of most antipoverty interventions are 
multidimensional. This characteristic—together with difficulties in measuring outcomes, 
the dangers of perverse incentives, informational advantages held by providers, and the 
presence of multiple financiers—makes designing contracts between financiers and 
providers a difficult exercise. In this context, beneficiary participation becomes desirable 
when it is advantageous to vest rights to control of residual benefits as close to the 25 
beneficiaries as possible. It also implies that the exact make up and weighting of the 
components of these interventions will most closely match those of the beneficiaries. 
Having noted these attractions, we end this section with two further caveats. First, 
as communities are rarely homogeneous, one must be careful when using phrases such as 
“community preferences.” Exactly who has a voice in the construction of these 
preference orderings may have a strong effect on the distribution of benefits generated by 
projects where the community plays a major role. Similar care should be attached to 
phrases such as “participation” and “authority.” In particular, vesting de jure but not de 
facto authority in communities may lead to disappointing results.  
 
3. PARTICIPATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION: 
EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA 
INTRODUCTION 
We have noted that the literature on participation and poverty reduction is rich in 
case study material and thin in quantitative analysis. In this section, we analyze the 
impact of participation on a wide range of outcomes, drawing on a unique database of 
public works projects from South Africa. Before moving to the empirical analysis, 
however, it is important to have some understanding of the background of these projects. 
We begin by describing the general development of these programs in South Africa, 
including characteristics of the programs nationally and in Western Cape province and 
the research methods used to generate this dataset. These sections are drawn from Adato 
et al. (1999). Finally, we present descriptive data on the individual projects that will be 
analyzed. With this background in place, we turn to a multivariate analysis of the impact 
of participation on these projects. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Public works as a mechanism for job creation in South Africa dates back to the 
nineteenth century. At that time, the replacement of white unskilled workers with cheaper 
black labor, together with a recessionary economy led to efforts to increase employment 
in both the public and private sectors. Subsequent economic growth reduced the need for 
this form of poor white relief (Khosa 1997). In the early 1980s, the national government 
developed the Special Employment Creation Programme in response to increasing levels 
of unemployment among the black population. In addition to being developed by a highly 
unpopular government, this program was poorly conceived. Training was funded at too 
low a level to make the programs anything other than relief-oriented. Overall funding was 
low and budget allocations were not tied to spatial unemployment levels. Furthermore, 
institutional structures were not altered to make the program function smoothly (Viljoen 
et al. 1987). 
In the early 1990s, with a new political and economic development framework 
taking shape, public works came back onto the policy agenda, and employment creation 
has been a major issue in both the 1994 and 1999 elections. A number of diverse civil 
society institutions have called on the state to play a direct role in tackling this problem. 
Labor-intensive public works have been proposed as a component of development 
strategies by, among others, the National Economic Forum, the African National 
Congress, the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme, the 
government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy, and the government-
commissioned Report on Poverty and Inequality (for references, see Adato et al. 1999a). 
The preeminent institution in developing the public works program was the 
National Economic Forum (NEF). The NEF was created by trade unions and the business 
sector in 1992 to formulate joint strategies for economic development. In 1993, an NEF 
task force was established to develop a proposal for a National Public Works Programme 
(NPWP), to be implemented by the new government upon attaining majority rule in 
1994. The mandate of the task force was to establish guidelines for public works projects 27 
that went beyond “make-work,” short-term poverty alleviation. Instead, the idea was to 
develop a program that was both participatory and sustainable. The Government of 
National Unity that took office in April 1994 published in September 1994 the White 
Paper on Reconstruction and Development (RDP). A component of the RDP was the use 
of public works to combat unemployment. Within this framework, the NPWP was 
established within the National Department of Public Works. The NPWP had two major 
components. The first was a framework in which the number of jobs created by public 
sector-financed construction could be increased via the regulation of the terms under 
which construction contracts are awarded so as to promote greater labor-intensity. The 
second component, of greater importance for this study, was a dedicated short-term job 
creation program, the Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP). 
Collectively, these components endowed the NPWP with the following objectives: 
 
•  Create, rehabilitate, and maintain physical assets that serve to meet the basic 
needs of poor communities and promote broader economic activity; 
•  Reduce unemployment through the creation of productive jobs; 
•  Educate and train those on the program as a means of economic 
empowerment; and 
•  Build the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs, strengthening 
local government and other institutions and the generation of sustainable 
economic development through community participation in infrastructure 
development. 
 
The CBPWP (and its subprogram, the Community Employment Program or CEP) 
was not the only mechanism by which labor-intensive public works were to be provided. 
Four other programs implemented nationally in Western Cape province had broadly 
similar objectives: the Clean and Green Programme (CAG), the Pilot Project Programme, 
the Public Works Programme-Transport, and the Working for Water Programme (WWP). 28 
The CBPWP sought to alleviate poverty through job creation, skills training, 
delivery of needed assets, and capacity building. It also sought to build the capacity of 
civil society to engage with development issues, giving opportunities for community-
based organizations to manage development projects, and NGOs to manage delivery and 
provide training (DPW 1997, p. 8). The CEP was part of the CBPWP, administered by a 
large national NGO—the Independent Development Trust (IDT). 
The CAG was funded by the national government, and aimed to facilitate the 
establishment, maintenance, and expansion of a clean, usable and sustainable community 
service and environment and alleviate poverty through job creation, human resource 
development, and income generation strategies. The Pilot Project Programme was 
initiated by the National Department of Public Works and consisted of 12 projects spread 
across the nine provinces and funded under the CBPWP. Its purpose was to “demonstrate 
to other government departments how reorientation of expenditure on infrastructure 
projects may be achieved” (Van Huyssteen et al. 1997). Key features of the projects were 
labor-intensive designs, tender documentation, skills training, community participation 
and liaison, labor management systems and task-based payment.  
The Public Works Programme-Transport drew on funds allocated from the RDP 
fund to the National Department of Transport. This was divided up among the provinces 
and administered by the provincial departments. These were managed by private 
consultants, with participation of community committees. The WWP was a job-creation 
and environmental program of the National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 
and was launched in 1995. It received funding from the Department of Finance as well as 
private sector and foreign funding. The program involved cutting down “invading alien 
plants,” i.e., non-indigenous species such as wattle, pine, and others that consume large 
quantities of water. It has two main benefits: job creation, and increasing water 
availability for domestic and commercial use. The WWP included skills training and 
education, support for small and medium enterprises, and local institutional capacity 
building as part of its mandate. In the Western Cape, the program came to be known as 
the Fynbos Working for Water Programme (FWWP).  29 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The data used in this analysis are drawn from a census of projects in seven public 
works programs situated in Western Cape Province. This province has a population of 
approximately 4 million, with almost 90 percent of all residents living in urban areas. It is 
divided into eight development regions. The province is dominated by the Cape 
Metropolitan Region, which contains nearly 70 percent of the population. The remaining 
seven development regions contain no urban centers larger than 100,000 people, and 
most have fewer than 20,000. The legacy of apartheid has constrained the geographical 
distribution of the Black population: the vast majority (76 percent) are found in the 
Metropolitan region, with smaller numbers located in the development regions of the 
Winelands, the Breede River, and the Southern Cape. 
The data on which this study is based is derived from a joint study between the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU), University of Cape Town.
13 The study 
purposively selected public works programs and then took a census of all projects within 
the programs. In choosing which programs to include in this research, they were guided 
by three criteria. First, they selected those that had a primary focus on the problem of 
unemployment and the alleviation of unemployment through job creation, rather than a 
primary focus on infrastructure development. Second, the programs included in the study 
constructed infrastructure or improved the environment in ways that were not simply 
make-work projects, but rather undertook the construction of assets or activities identified 
                                                 
13 As the Western Cape is socioeconomically better off than the rest of the country, one might wonder why 
this region was selected for the study. First, there are still significant poverty problems. In addition, we 
chose to evaluate projects in the Western Cape because unlike a survey of households or businesses, 
collecting data on project performance requires especially good access to those responsible for developing 
and implementing these activities. In the case of Western Cape Province, SALDRU had participated on the 
commission that developed the structure and allocated funding in the first new public works program in the 
province. Consequently, they had developed a relationship with other members of this body who 
subsequently moved into key provincial institutions responsible for development, infrastructure delivery, 
and job creation. The fieldwork could thus be designed with the participation of these institutions; access 
could be gained to key informants, project sites, and project records; and feedback could be obtained on 
initial results. 30 
as high priority for the communities involved. Third, all the programs selected sought to 
create skills and community empowerment in addition to the jobs and quality assets. 
The seven programs that met these criteria are profiled in Table 1.
14 
 
Table 1—Public works programs included in the study 
 
 












Types of Infrastructure 
Clean and Green (CAG)  Provincial Department 
of Transport and Public 
Works (DTPW) 
10  1  Cleaning (2), greening, 
alien vegetation clearing 
(7), parking area 
Community Based Public 
Works (CBPWP) 
DTPW  18  10  Community center, roads, 
storm water drainage, 






22  21  Community center, roads, 
storm water drainage, 
sanitation, school, crèche, 
clinic, greening, roads 
and storm water 
Fynbos Water Conservation 
Project (FWCP), also known 
as the Fynbos Working for 
Water Project (FWWP) 
Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF)/Cape Nature 
Conservation 
14  11  Alien vegetation clearing 
Pilot Projects (Pilot)  DPW/DTPW  2  0  Roads and storm water 






WCEDF/DBSA  29  19  Community center, roads, 
storm water drainage, 
sanitation, water supply, 
cleanup, recreation 
grounds, roads and storm 
water, multiple services, 
bridge 
Source: Adato et al. 1999. 
 
Using project documents, and mail-in questionnaires with follow-up telephone 
calls and visits, quantitative and qualitative data were collected for each project. The data 
were collected in the following manner. Initially, all program-level documents were 
identified for each of the seven programs (monthly reports, final project close out reports, 
                                                 
14 Other public works programs, such as the Municipal Infrastructure Programme and the Integrated Service 
Land Projects were excluded from this census. These were principally low-cost infrastructure projects with 
employment creation considered a by-product. 31 
project review summaries, etc.). However, these were new programs that had focused 
more on getting off the ground than on monitoring. It was soon determined that these 
documents either contained data taken from project applications and did not reflect actual 
data collected during project implementation, or were incomplete, existing for some 
projects and not others and/or containing certain pieces of data for some projects and not 
others, or containing data that were of questionable origin or contradictory. Thus, in order 
to get accurate data, a project-level questionnaire was designed and administered to 
implementing agents for each project. In many cases, the implementing agent did not 
have the data, and visits had to be made to a range of program and project administrators 
or managers, consultants, contractors, and accountants who helped the researchers to 
track down data. In the case of the IDT projects, however, the program managers would 
not allow the researchers access to project facilitators, and so certain categories of 
information are missing for many of these projects. 
Table 2 lists the broad categories of data collected for each project. 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND PROJECT OUTCOMES: A DESCRIPTION 
Quantitatively assessing the impact of community participation and project outcomes 
requires first that we define precisely what these concepts mean. Recall from the 
discussion in Section 2 that it is important to distinguish between de jure and de facto 
authority. Our measure of de jure authority is based on information contained in 
contractual agreements between providers and programs. Specifically, we can divide 
these projects into three groups: (1) those where de jure authority to implement the 
project is vested solely with a community based organization (CBO); (2) those where de 
jure authority to implement the project is shared between a CBO and an either a 
government body or an NGO; and (3) those where the community has no de jure 
authority for project implementation. 
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Table 2: Project-level data collected for 101 Western Cape public works projects  
Category of information  Type of data collected 
Project location  Town, residence of workers, magisterial district, development region; rural/urban 
Duration  Actual and projected; dates 
Institutional arrangements  Administering institution; applicant; type of implementing agent (community 
organization, government, private sector, NGO, or partnership); nature of 
community role; identity of consultants and contractors 
Assets and activities  Primary activities and project components. 
Costs  Projected and actual; sources of funding (tiers of government and private) 
Employment generated  Projected and actual work days, for men and women 
Wages  Wage rates, initial and final, skilled and unskilled; comparative rural sector wage 
rates 
Payment systems  Daily wage or task-based 
Labour disputes  Existence or absence 
Training  Costs; number of days; content; training institution 
Small/medium enterprises  Existence or absence 
Second-round effects  Existence or absence, and types  
Maintenance arrangements  Responsible institution 
Source: Adato et al. 1999. 
 
 
Based on qualitative information collected on each project, it is also possible to 
determine the source of real or de facto authority. Along these lines, these projects can be 
divided into four categories: (1) the CBO is solely responsible for all aspects of the 
project, including design, overseeing the contractors, setting wages, selecting workers, 
controlling the bank accounts, etc.; (2) the CBO, together with another implementing 
actor, jointly participates in decision-making over some or all aspects of the project, 
including design, overseeing the contractors, setting wages, selecting workers, controlling 
bank accounts, etc.; (3) the CBO assists in selecting workers, mediates disputes, liaises 
with the community, but is not a decision-maker; and (4) the community has little or no 
involvement in the project. 33 
Table 3 cross-tabulates these classifications. Table 3a uses the descriptions from 
the previous paragraph. There are no examples of projects where the community has de 
facto, but not de jure, decision-making authority. Conversely, there is only one instance 
where sole de jure authority does not translate into sole de facto authority. More 
interesting are the projects where de jure authority is shared between the community and 
some other agency. De jure sharing of decision-making power clearly translates into a 
variety of practices, ranging from the community having sole to no decision-making 
power. Table 3b collapses these broader categories into a two-by-two table, 
distinguishing projects by whether or not the community has some form of decision-
making authority. 
 
Table 3a—Cross-tabulation of projects by de jure and de facto authority, narrow 
distinctions 
 De  jure authority  














Community is sole decision-maker  29  2  0  31 
Community is joint decision-maker  1  23  0  24 
Community advises but does not decide  0  32  0  32 
Little or no community involvement  0  3  9  12 
Column sums  30  60  9  99 
 
 
Table 3b—Cross-tabulation of projects by de jure and de facto authority, broad 
distinctions  
  Community has some de jure 
authority 
Community has no de jure 
authority 
Community makes decisions  55 0 
Community does not make decisions  35  9 
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We now consider seven project outcomes. These are divided into three broad 
categories. The first is the ability of these projects to utilize publicly provided funds in a 
cost-efficient manner. Three outcomes are used to describe  
1.  the amount spent to create one day of employment (calculated by dividing the 
number of days of employment generated by the project by its total cost);  
2.  the cost to the government of transferring funds to the poor. This variable is the 
benefit stream generated by the project divided by the government expenditure on 
it. The denominator is straightforward to estimate, but the numerator is not. The 
benefit stream consists of transfer benefits to workers net of what they would 
have earned in the project’s absence plus nontransfer benefits captured by the 
poor. Calculating the numerator relies on a number of assumptions, some rather 
heroic, that are documented in Haddad and Adato (1999). A low value indicates 
that the project is cost-efficient in delivering resources to the poor; and 
3.  the level of cost overruns, computed as the difference between the final cost of the 
completed project with the projected costs as submitted in the project proposal. 
This variable is negative in those instances where the project comes in under 
budget. The second set of outcomes captures the extent to which project benefits 
flow to individuals in the form of wages and training. These are measured by 
wages as a proportion of total project costs and the ratio of training days to days 
of employment. The third set of outcomes measures the extent to which these 
projects target particular groups within these localities.  
This is measured in two ways: 
1.  via the ratio of the daily project wage to the local unskilled wage. Consistent with 
the literature on self-targeting of public works, a lower ratio is indicative of 
improved targeting towards the poor; and  
2.  the percentage of employment that goes to women. 35 
Tables 4a and 4b compare the mean values of these seven outcomes, 
disaggregated by measures of de jure and de facto participation. 
 
Table 4a—Mean values of selected project outcomes, disaggregated by de jure 
community participation 
 Community  has 




Community has no 






(z statistic on 
differences in 
means in italics) 






Cost to government of transferring one rand 





































Sample size  90  9   
 
Table 4b—Mean values of selected project outcomes, disaggregated by de facto 
community participation 
  
Community has some 
de facto authority 
(standard deviation 
in parentheses) 
Community has no 






(Z statistic on 
differences in 
means in italics) 






Cost to government of transferring one rand 





































Sample size  54  43   36 
Comparing the impact of de jure and de facto decision-making authority across 
these different outcomes, one finds that although there are some apparent differences in 
outcomes, the standard deviations are so large that in only one case of de jure 
participation—the difference in the percentage of employment going to women is higher 
and the difference is statistically significant—do we observe any impact of community 
participation. But there are three reasons why we might not want to put too much weight 
on these findings. First, they do not take into account the processes by which projects 
were situated in particular localities—what Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons (1993) call 
endogenous program placement. Second, they do not take into account the possible 
endogeneity of community participation. And third, they do not account for other factors, 
e.g., project characteristics such as size and type of asset created—that might also affect 
these outcomes. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION I: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
It is helpful to begin by specifying the relationship between community 
participation and outcomes associated with poverty reduction. This can be written as  
 
   Iij = c + β  · CPij + γ ij ′  · Pij + η i′  · Li + eij ,  (3.1) 
 
where 
Iij   =  the outcome indicator of project j located in locality i;  
c  =  the constant term; 
CPij   =  captures the extent of community participation in the project; 
Pij   =  a vector of other project characteristics; 
Li   =  a vector of locality characteristics; 
β , γ ij , η i   =  parameters to be estimated; 
eij   =  an error term. 
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We now describe other project characteristics that we include in our multivariate 
analysis. The size of the project is proxied by its projected duration. Different types of 
public works activities—the construction of buildings and roads and bridges and 
removing alien vegetation and garbage—will have different requirements for materials 
and for specialist inputs such as engineering design. This will have implications for our 
performance indicators. We have grouped the assets being constructed into three broad 
categories: community buildings such as centers, schools, and clinics; basic infrastructure 
activities such as road, storm sewers, sanitation sewers, and water reticulation; and other 
activities such as the removal of alien vegetation and general “cleaning and greening.” 
We also include controls for project location: whether the project is sited in the Cape 
Metropolitan and Winelands area, and whether it is situated in a rural area outside of 
Cape/Winelands (leaving, as the base category, being an urban locality outside the 
Cape/Winelands). 
Our data on other locality characteristics were generated by merging information 
on project location with data that describes the 34 districts in which the projects are 
located. These are drawn from the 1995 October Household Survey (OHS), conducted by 
the Government of South Africa’s Central Statistics Service. In the multivariate analysis 
reported below, we include as a control the average wage for comparable semi-skilled 
work by district. It is also worth noting that, in preliminary estimates, we used a wide 
range of additional district level characteristics from these data. These included: average 
household size; proportion of female headed households; the percent of individuals that 
have completed standard 5 and standard 8 of schooling (standard 10 is the equivalent of 
completing high school); mean per-capita incomes; the standard deviation of per capita 
incomes; the standard deviation of male and female wages; the proportion of households 
below the poverty line; the proportion of households reporting that they are unable to 
feed their children; the district rate of unemployment; the district rate of long-term 
(greater than one year) unemployment; proportion of adults by occupational class; 
housing quality (size, building materials, sanitation); levels of home ownership; access to 
water, electricity, telephones, transport and health facilities; reported crime levels; and 38 
how the district ranks relative to other districts on measures of infrastructure (based on a 
set of housing characteristics and access to services). Further, we experimented with a 
variety of combinations of these variables, e.g., an infrastructure index. Adding in any of 
these variables has no substantive impact on our results. We experimented with different 
controls for project location, but again with no meaningful impact on the results reported 
below. Finally, in preliminary runs we included a set of dummy variables that reflected 
our subjective assessment of the quality of the project level data we had obtained. These 
had no statistical significance and their inclusion does not substantively alter the results 
below. 
Next, note that endogenous program placement would imply some correlation 
between CPij and eij and/or between Pij and eij. For example, we might believe that a 
project to upgrade roads might be situated in an area where roads were in particularly bad 
shape. However, based on our knowledge of these projects, it is unlikely that endogenous 
program placement is a significant factor. 
To select projects for the CBPWP, a provincial government task team gathered a 
wide range of stakeholders (an intersectoral group made up of representatives from 
government, community organizations, trade unions, and the construction industry), and 
ranked project applications based on program criteria related to labor intensity, training, 
community participation, budget factors including percentage costs going to communities 
and the private sector, management and maintenance provisions, and ability of the 
applicant to implement the project. Applications were solicited using de jure and informal 
networks of contacts between government officials at provincial and local level, between 
government officials and consultants, and between NGOs, community based 
organizations (CBOs), and other sectoral interest groups. No attempt was made to select 
localities based on socioeconomic criteria. The CEP projects were also ranked according 
to their fit with program criteria, although selection was made by the administering 
institution, the IDT. There is evidence that the IDT had a socioeconomic profile that it 
planned to use (CBPWP meeting minutes, 12/6/94), but no supporting evidence could be 
found to show whether these were actually used. The WCEDF projects were selected 39 
using a similar process as described for the CBPWP. The intersectoral WCEDF 
established the Short-Term Job Creation Commission that received proposals and 
forwarded them for review to its steering committee. The committee appraised and 
approved projects, ranking them according to their fit with program objectives. As with 
the CBPWP, projects were directed at communities known to be poor, but communities 
were not selected for their relative poverty according to statistical information. 
The CAG projects were selected by a government task team that reviewed 
applications from CBOs and NGOs. They were selected based on their fit with program 
criteria. These projects had more restrictive criteria in that they all had urban locations 
(around Cape Town), required matching funds from local government, and were limited 
to environmental projects.  
In three of the community-based programs, the CBPWP, CEP, and WCEDF, a 
number of communities learned of the availability of project funds through engineering 
consultants. These consultants, some of whom had offices in rural areas, had experience 
with drawing up applications, tendering for contracts, and accessing government funds. 
As Adato and Haddad (1999) note, this had the effect that communities that had no such 
contacts—and thus were likely to be more isolated and have greater need for capacity 
building and infrastructure—were less likely to apply. 
The Pilot Projects program allocated funding for only one project in the Western 
Cape, although this was later split into two jointly administered projects. These were 
placed in Khayelitsha, a township outside of Cape Town, after the town engineer’s office 
identified an area of Khayelitsha that, unlike the rest of the township, did not have roads 
and stormwater drainage. This office, together with a consultant who had obtained public 
contracts in the past, phoned various government departments to inquire about the 
availability of funds for the project. The RDP-Transport projects were selected by the 
provincial Department of Transport and Public Works. Community participation was a 
requirement of RDP funds, but was solicited after project selection. Communities did not 
apply for projects. Instead, locations for road building were selected by the Department, 
based on a backlog of needed infrastructure in areas that served poor communities. 40 
The FWWP project locations were selected by DWAF, which took into account 
two main criteria: (1) ecological factors (whether there was a need for alien vegetation 
removal in the area), and (2) social factors (whether: there were nearby Black 
communities where people needed jobs). In this case, ecological but not socioeconomic 
data was used in making a determination.  
Several additional remarks are worth noting. First, none of the programs appear to 
have used socioeconomic data to determine which areas should receive priority. Second, 
no locality received funding for more than one project within one program, but programs 
paid no attention to what other development project funding the locality received. Third, 
it became clear that engineering consultants played a large role in gaining access to 
public works funds for a particular locality. They informed communities about the 
availability of funds, assisted in the preparation of project applications, and were almost 
inevitably contracted to design the infrastructure. This process was summarized by one 
consulting engineer: 
 
What we do in the past, engineers, professional firms like us, used to sit 
back and wait for the government to appoint us…. But now the new 
system is that we can go out in the field, we can advertise, we can go 
speak and sell ourselves you see. …When we first started here it was 
1993, we visited all the small towns and we said, well you know the new 
funding is going to work like this, you’ve got to apply…and the more you 
apply for and the quicker you apply, the more you’ll get (Adato and 
Haddad 1999). 
 
This impression of projects allocated according to a wide, and in some ways 
unsystematic, set of criteria is further supported by Adato and Haddad (1999). They 
systematically examine the relationship between locality and project selection, and 
characteristics of the districts in which these projects are sited. They find no evidence of 
any systematic relationship. Accordingly, we continue with the assumption that concerns 41 
regarding nonrandom placement of interventions in selected communities are not 
warranted here. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION II: SELECTIVITY AND OMITTED VARIABLE BIAS 
We now turn to our second concern, that the ability of communities to participate 
in these projects is correlated with characteristics of the localities themselves. A priori, 
this would seem to be a significantly greater source of concern. Both the case study 
evidence reviewed in the previous section, as well as the narrative above, point to the 
notion that the ability of communities to formulate and implement projects might be 
related to other community characteristics. Our approach, in the face of such concerns, is 
to look for variables that are associated with the ability to “participate,” but are 
independent of project outcomes. Specifically, following an idea found in Mauro (1995), 
we assume that the extent to which localities are “fractionalized” affects the ability of 
these communities to participate in the development and implementation of projects, but 
is unrelated to project outcomes apart from their impact on community participation. We 
use three measures of fractionalization: the percentage of adults who are divorced; an 
index of racial fractionalization; and an index of political fractionalization. These indices 
take the following general form: 
 
  index of fractionalization = 1 - Σ i=1
I (ni / N)
2 , i = 1, …, I, 
 
where ni is the number of people in the ith group, N is the total population, and I is the 
number of groups. Our index of racial fractionalization draws on data at the magisterial 
district level on the percentage of individuals from different racial groups (White, 
Colored, African, Asian). Our index of political fractionalization is constructed using the 
shares of votes obtained by different political parties in the November 1995 and March 
1996 local elections.
15 The extent of community participation is hypothesized to be 
                                                 
15 Our thanks to Ridwaan Haywood for supplying us with these data. 42 
affected by the magisterial district level percentage of adults who have completed 
standard 8 schooling. This captures the level of human capital in these communities that 
one might believe is associated with the ability to participate in project decision-making. 
Again, it is worth noting that we experimented with the inclusion of other 
variables that we believed might affect community participation. These included 
measures of crime in these communities; measures of economic stratification (such as the 
standard deviation of earnings, levels of unemployment; percentage of individuals in 
different occupations; levels and severity of poverty); and measures of community access 
to infrastructure (such as distance to various facilities; access to telephones); and other 
measures of political activity, such as voter turn out and the identity of the party that 
controlled the local council. None of these variables had explanatory power in the 
regressions used to predict the probability of participation and hence are not included in 
the analysis below. 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating probits on the determinants of de jure 
and de facto participation (as described in Table 3b above) in these projects. The 
variables that are to be used as instruments are written out in italics. The standard errors 
have been calculated using the Huber/White method. 
Note that the chi-squared statistic on the instruments is significant at the 5 percent 
level for measures of both de jure and de facto participation. Also note that as the 
percentage of adults divorced has virtually no impact on de jure participation, this 
variable is dropped when we estimate the selectivity corrected models below. The 
striking marginal impacts of these instruments are given in Table 6. Every 0.01 change in 
the index of racial fractionalization causes the probability of de jure participation to fall 
by about 0.1. However, the impact on the probability of de facto participation is almost 
30 times larger; a similar change causes the probability of de facto participation to fall by 
roughly 2.8 percent. These marginal effects also show that increases in the level of 
education in the district in which the project is sited has a small positive impact on the 
likelihood that the community has some de facto decision-making power. It also 
reassures on the one puzzling finding of Table 5, namely the negative coefficient on  43 
Table 5—Determinants of de jure and de facto authority 
 Dependent variable equals one where: 
 Community  has 
some de jure 
authority 
Community has 
some de jure 
authority 
Community has 
some de facto 
authority 
































































Chi squared on joint significance of all regressors  17.88**  17.03**  46.46** 
Chi squared on joint significance of instruments  9.55**  9.53**  14.46** 
Notes: Variables used as instruments are written in italics. Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. 




education in the de jure authority probit. The marginal effect of this variable is very 
small; increasing the percentage of adults with standard 8 schooling by 15 percentage 
points (roughly the difference between the 75
th and 25
th percentiles of mean schooling) 




                                                 
16 We suspect that this negative coefficient is a statistical fluke. Four of the nine projects in which there is 
no formal community participation are part of the Clean and Green Programme, and all are located in urban 
Cape Town districts with relatively high levels of schooling. 44 
Table 6—Marginal impact of instruments on de jure and de facto authority 
  Increasing the right-hand side variable by 0.01 
causes the probability of participation to change by: 
  Community has some de 
jure authority 
Community has some 
de facto authority 
Percentage of adults divorced  -  -0.094 
Index of racial fractionalization  -0.090  -2.786 
Index of political fractionalization  -0.068  -2.278 
Percentage of adults with standard 8 schooling  -0.0007  0.013 
 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
We now turn to the results of estimating equation (3.1). These are found in Tables 
7 and 8. Three specifications are reported. The first augments equation (3.1) to take into 
account possible selectivity biases associated with community participation. Specifically, 
we estimate a treatment effects model using Heckman’s (1979) two-step consistent 
estimator (estimating the model using a full information maximum likelihood estimator 
does not produce results different from those reported here). Specifically, we denote our 
model of the determinants of community participation as 
 
CPij* = γ′  · Wij + uij        (3.2) 
CPij = 1 if CPij* >0, 0 otherwise. 
 
If eij (from equation 3.1) and uij are correlated—that is, if there are characteristics 
that affect both the likelihood of community participation and project outcomes, then 
estimating equation (3.1) without accounting for this bias will overstate the impact of 
community participation. The unbiased expectation of project outcomes where the 
community participates is 
 
E[Iij | CPij = 1]  = c + β  · CPij + γ ij′  · Pij + η i′  · Li + E[eij | CPij = 1] 
 =  c + β  · CPij + γ ij′  · Pij + η i′  · Li + ρσ eλ (-γ′  · Wij).  45 
In addition, we also report the results of estimating equation (3.1) without 
correcting for selectivity. A third specification augments equation (3.1) by including 
those variables used as instruments to predict the likelihood that the community has 
either de jure or de facto participation in these projects. As there are a large number of 
results to report (the determinants of seven project outcomes are estimated using three 
specifications and two measures of participation), only the participation measures, the 
first-stage instruments, and the inverse Mill’s ratio are reported in Tables 7 and 8. The 
full results, including the control variables (projected project duration, asset type being 
created, project location, and local wage rates), are found in Appendix 2. 
Table 7a—The impact of de jure participation on the log of the cost of creating one 
day of employment 






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -0.313 
(0.377) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -1.132 
(1.000) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.19 
Table 7b—The impact of de jure participation on the cost of transferring one rand 
to a poor person  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  5.177 
(0.680) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -9.098 
(0.957) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.37 46 
Table 7c–The impact of de jure participation on the log of level of cost overruns 






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -627.574 
(0.821) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  536.485 
(1.262) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.21 
Table 7d—The impact of de jure participation on the percentage of project costs 
that are paid out as wages  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.058 
(0.208) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.095 
(0.273) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.91 
Table 7e—The impact of de jure participation on the ratio of training days to days 
of employment  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -3.074 
(0.128) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -17.689 
(0.658) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.59 47 
Table 7f—The impact of de jure participation on the ratio of project wages to local, 
unskilled wages  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.178 
(0.692) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.259 
(1.051) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.13 
 
 
Table 7g—The impact of de jure participation on the ratio of percentage of 
employment days to women  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  46.145 
(1.766)* 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  19.861 
(0.660) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  2.54* 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8a—The impact of de facto participation on the log of the cost of creating one 
day of employment 






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  0.029 
(0.488) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -0.264 
(0.320) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -1.725 
(1.352) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.86 
 
 
Table 8b—The impact of de facto participation on the cost of transferring one rand 
to a poor person 






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  0.748 
(1.474) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  3.398 
(0.464) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -16.676 
(1.608) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.91 
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Table 8c—The impact of de facto participation on the log of level of cost overruns 






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  0.278 
(0.015) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -550.673 
(0.651) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  712.812 
(1.409) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.19 
 
 
Table 8d—The impact of de facto participation on the percentage of project costs 
that are paid out as wages  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  0.007 
(0.458) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.049 
(0.176) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.254 
(0.678) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.84 
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Table 8e—The impact of de facto participation on the ratio of training days to days 
of employment 






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  -0.114 
(0.113) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  3.973 
(0.156) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -19.645 
(0.653) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.30 
 
Table 8f: The impact of de facto participation on the ratio of project wages to local, 
unskilled wages  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  0.024 
(1.771)* 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.157 
(0.584) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.119 
(0.437) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.60 
 
Collectively, Tables 7 and 8 report results from 42 different regressions. For this 
reason, it is helpful to note the following key results. First, there is good reason to believe 
that we have an appropriate set of instruments to measure community participation. 
Recall from Table 5 that our instrument set—the percentage of adults divorced, the 
indices of racial and political fractionalization, and the proportion of adults with standard 
8 schooling—were clearly correlated with both de jure and de facto participation. In  51 
Table 8g—The impact of de facto participation on the ratio of percentage of 
employment days to women  






With no selectivity control, 
instruments for 
participation included 






Divorced -  -  -0.922 
(0.411) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  44.063 
(1.781)* 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  28.619 
(0.907) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.94 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
 
Tables 7 and 8, we report the results of including these variables as regressors. With one 
exception (the index of racial fractionalization is significant at the 10 percent level in the 
regressions on the percentage of employment going to women), these instruments have 
no impact on project outcomes. 
Second, there is little evidence to suggest that even with these good instruments, 
there is much in the way of selectivity bias. In only one of the 14 models estimated 
(Table 7f) is the selectivity correction term significant at the 5 percent level. 
Third, Tables 7c and 8c indicate that neither de jure nor de facto community 
participation increases the level of cost overruns. This is an important finding, as there is 
often concern—and certainly one voiced to us privately in South Africa—that 
communities lack the ability to manage budgets. These results indicate that they certainly 
do no worse than other providers. 
Apart from these findings, however, it would seem that neither de jure nor de 
facto participation have a strong impact on project outcomes. But such an interpretation is 
premature. In these specifications, participation is entered in a rather restrictive fashion, 
as a variable that shifts the intercept up and down. Furthermore, these specifications do 52 
not distinguish between the effect of different levels of participation. We address these 
weaknesses below.  
In Tables 9 and 10, we interact measures of community participation with the type 
of asset being created. This permits us to determine whether, conditional on the asset 
being created, participation affects a particular outcome. Since there was evidence of 
selectivity bias in the results reported on the ratio of project to local wages, that outcome 
is not used below. The logic underlying these interaction terms is as follows. 
 
Table 9—The impact of de jure participation on six project outcomes, interacting 
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Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specifications are OLS estimates 
with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. Other regressors included but not reported are project location, 




Recall from the discussion above that the type of project available to the 
community was exogenously determined. Community participation affected how the 
project was implemented. These different project types—buildings, roads, and 
environmental cleanup—can be thought of as embodying different types of technologies  53 
Table 10—The impact of de facto participation on six project outcomes, interacting 
participation with the asset being created 
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Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specifications are OLS estimates 
with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. Other regressors included but not reported are project location, 
project duration and log of community wage. Infrastructure includes roads, bridges, storm sewers, and 
sanitation sewers. 
 
with differing scopes for cost reduction, the substitution of labor for capital, and 
opportunities for training. For example, a road can be constructed out of asphalt using a 
paver. Alternatively, it can be built by laying bricks, a more labor-intensive activity that 
also provides an opportunity to develop brick-making skills.  
With this in mind, consider the outcome “wage bill as a percentage of total costs” 
reported in Table 10. The coefficient on community buildings is –0.477 indicating that 
relative to the omitted category, other activities such as the removal of alien vegetation 
and general “cleaning and greening,” the construction of these buildings lowers the share 
of the budget going to wages by almost 50 percent. However, note that the interaction 
term—community buildings interacted with de facto participation—is positive (0.286) 
and significant. This tells us that relative to all projects where community buildings are 
constructed, de facto community participation raises labor intensity by almost 25 percent. 
Even more striking is the case where de facto community participation is interacted with 
the category basic infrastructure (roads, storm water drainage, sanitation, and water 54 
reticulation). Here, the share of the budget going to wages is almost 60 percent lower 
than is the case where the project undertakes activities such as the removal of alien 
vegetation and “cleaning and greening.” But where the community has de facto 
participation in the project, this negative effect on labor intensity disappears with the 
interaction term being negative and almost equal in magnitude. 
Also note that the interpretation on the variables de facto and de jure where they 
are not interacted with asset type. They refer to the effect of participation on the omitted 
category (the removal of alien vegetation and “cleaning and greening”). In Table 10, the 
negative coefficient where the outcome is “wage bill as a percentage of total costs” 
indicates that as de facto community participation increases, a smaller proportion of 
project funds are spent on wages. 
Tables 9 and 10 reveal two interesting findings. First, the interactions between 
asset type and community participation are taken into account, there is much stronger 
evidence of effect of participation on project outcomes. Second, de jure and de facto 
participation do not seem to have similar impacts on these outcomes. For example, de 
jure community participation appears to raise the cost of creating one day of work when 
the project entails the construction of a community building, but lowers the cost where 
the activity involves some form of environmental cleanup or improvement. By contrast, 
de facto participation only affects this outcome when basic infrastructure is being created. 
De jure participation does not alter the labor intensity of projects and lowers the 
percentage of employment going to women when the asset being created is a building or 
item of basic infrastructure. However, de jure participation raises the percentage of 
employment to women when the activity is basic environmental cleanup. By contrast, de 
facto participation increases project labor intensity unless the activity is environmental 
cleanup and has no impact on the percentage of employment going to women. Neither de 
jure nor de facto participation affects the cost of transferring one rand to a poor person or 
the ratio of training days to days of employment created. 
The comparisons reported in Tables 7 through 10 have focused on some measure 
of participation that is contrasted with its absence. But recall from Table 3 that there is 55 
also very good information on what form community participation actually takes in these 
projects. Bearing in mind that selectivity considerations do not appear to be substantial 
here, we re-estimate our basic specification, but include variables that describe more 
precisely the nature of community participation. Results from these regressions are 
reported in Tables 11 and 12. 
 
Table 11—The impact of de jure participation on six project outcomes, by type of de 
jure participation 
  Coefficient on community has sole 
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Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specifications are OLS estimates 
with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. Other regressors included but not reported are project location, 
project duration, asset created and log of community wage. 
 
Table 12—The impact of de facto participation on six project outcomes, by type of 
de facto participation 
  Coefficient on 
community is sole 
decision-maker 
Coefficient on 
community is joint 
decision-maker 
Coefficient on community 
advises but does not 
decide 
Log of cost of creating one 
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Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specifications are OLS estimates 
with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. Other regressors included but not reported are project location, 
project duration, asset created and log of community wage. 56 
The results reported in Tables 11 and 12 are striking. There would appear to be 
virtually no impact of de jure community participation on any of these outcomes. 
However, de facto participation makes these interventions more cost effective in terms of 
reducing the costs associated with creating employment and transferring resources to the 
poor.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This section has examined the effect of community participation on a variety of 
outcomes associated with public works projects implemented in Western Cape Province, 
South Africa, between 1995 and 1997. In this analysis, we have considered seven 
outcomes that capture the ability of these projects to utilize publicly provided funds in a 
cost-efficient manner (the number of rand spent to create one day of employment, the 
cost to the government of transferring one rand to the poor, and the level of cost 
overruns), the extent to which project benefits flow to individuals in the form of wages 
and training, and the extent to which these projects target particular groups within these 
localities. We have considered the impact of both de jure and de facto authority in terms 
of their direct effect, their effect conditional on the type of asset being created, and 
variations within these broad categories. These considerations have produced a large 
number of parameter estimates, and so it is helpful to summarize our core findings. 
Two issues underlie our estimation strategy: the appropriate definition of 
participation; and the need to take into account a number of econometric concerns, 
notably nonrandom program placement and unobserved selectivity effects that might 
influence both project outcomes and the likelihood of community participation. For the 
projects considered here, it turns out that the former issue is extremely important while 
the latter is relatively unimportant. Our detailed knowledge of the manner in which these 
programs operated, together with the statistical analysis undertaken by Adato and Haddad 
(1999) indicate no correlation between the localities in which projects were sited and 
observable characteristics of those communities. In section 3.5, we used measures of 
community fractionalization—such as the extent of racial and political diversity—to 57 
predict the likelihood of community participation in these projects. These variables 
demonstrate strong associations with the likelihood of participation (as shown in Table 5) 
while having no direct effect on project outcomes (as shown in Tables 7 and 8). We find 
only one instance where there is evidence of selectivity bias. 
By contrast, the manner in which participation is measured is particularly 
important. In general, measures of de jure participation are less strongly associated with 
project outcomes than are measures of de facto participation. We find that de facto 
participation lowers the ratio of project to local wages, provided selectivity biases are 
taken into account (Table 8g), increases the labor intensity of projects that provide 
community buildings, roads, or sewers, and lowers the cost of creating employment 
(Table 10 and 3.12) and of transferring funds to poor individuals (Table 12). There is 
weak evidence to suggest that where communities advise, but do not make decisions, that 
the percentage of employment going to women rises. We find no evidence that 
community participation increases cost overruns or the ratio of training to employment 
created, an exception to the former being the case of environmental improvement 
activities (where the effect is not especially well measured). In these projects, de facto 
community participation is generally associated with improved project cost-effectiveness 
and better targeting. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the relationship between community participation and 
the efficacy of interventions designed to reduce poverty. We develop some simple 
analytics that are used to structure a review of the extant literature and motivate the 
analysis of the effect of participation on the efficacy of public works interventions in 
South Africa. These analytics suggest that because communities possess informational 
advantages not available to outsiders, community participation offers the prospect of 
lowering the cost of antipoverty interventions. In cases where the outcomes of 
interventions are difficult to measure, community participation is attractive because it is 58 
more likely to produce a set of outcomes actually desired by the community. However, 
this observation must be used with some care, because these outcomes may not be those 
desired by all members of the community, nor by those who finance the interventions. 
These arguments are supported both by a review of the extant literature and also by a 
multivariate analysis of the effect of community participation on public works projects in 
South Africa. We find that increasing community participation reduces the cost of these 
interventions and improves their targeting towards the poor. 59 
APPENDIX 1: 
SOME SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
Consider a world composed of three groups. The first is a government bureaucrat 
attempting to deal with problems of poverty—with a limited budget. The second is a 
community organization—a group of influential individuals within the community who 
may be called upon run the program on behalf of government. The organization may 
called upon in a managerial capacity, but has no budget of its own to run the program. 
The third group is the set of beneficiaries from the program: the poor. 
The program is characterized by a pair of objectives, (z1, z2). These objectives 
might be the extent to which the program gives short- and long-term support to the poor. 
Thus, z1 may be the level of current consumption that is aimed at in the program (usually 
defined as the poverty objective), while the second is a measure of the extent to which the 
program tries to create human capital and eliminate long-term poverty. 
The poverty alleviation program has two possible managers: the government or 
the community. We assume that the community enjoys an absolute advantage in 
production of both goals. Thus, let C (z1, z2) be the governments cost function and c 
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 for all (z1, z2), i = (1, 2). 
It would be easy to formalize the advantage to the community in terms of some 
informational advantage. However, there is no need to be specific right now. 
The poor gain long- and short-term benefits from poverty reduction denoted by 
B(z1, z2). We assume that B () ⋅ ⋅ ,  is increasing on both of its arguments. We also assume 
that the poor do not pay any of the costs of poverty reduction, so their welfare is higher 
whenever there is an increase in the realization of any of the program objectives, holding 
the other fixed. Since this is some kind of poverty indicator, this benefit function is 
embodies possible trade-offs between different groups of poor (women versus men, old 60 
versus young and different ethnic groups). Since this involves aggregation, this is not 
value free. 
We assume that the community and the government have their own objectives in 
addition to caring about the poor. For the government this is  
 
()( ) () ()2 1 1 2 1 , 1 , , z z B z z g z z G β β − + = , 
 
where g() ⋅ ⋅ ,  represents any “private” benefit that the government receives from having 
the program designed in a particular way. It could, for example, represent the fact that the 
government prefers to not to deliver significant benefits to women or particular ethnic 
groups. It could also represent differences in discount rates that imply different weighting 
of long- and short-term poverty alleviation benefits. The parameter β  denotes the weight 
given to the government’s versus the poor’s payoff. 
  The community’s preference is denoted by  
 
()( ) ( ) ()2 1 1 2 1 , 1 , , z z B z z r z z R α α − + = , 
 
where r () ⋅ ⋅ , denotes the “private” payoff of the community organization and α  is the 
weight that it attaches to its own preference relative to that of the poor beneficiaries. 
We begin by considering what would happen if the government managed the 
poverty reduction program. It decides on how much of each objective to realize given the 
cost that it bears. We assume that any government expenditures not allocated to the 
project can be spent on some other valuable activity whose price is normalized at one. 
Thus, the government‘s objective is to choose (z1, z2) to maximize G (z1, z2) - C (z1, z2). 
Let the optimal values of this be, ( )
G G z z 2 1 , . Thus, the benefit to the poor is B
G ( )
G G z z 2 1 ,.  
The community’s payoff is R ( )
G G z z 2 1 ,.  
We now consider the effect of community involvement in implementing the 
project. This depends upon the kind of contractual possibilities between the government 
and the community organization. First, observe that if the community does have access to 61 
a better technology for poverty reduction, then a Pareto improvement is, in principle, 
possible from decentralizing the program to have some kind of community involvement. 
This is because c ( )
G G z z 2 1 ,<   C ( )
G G z z 2 1 , . Thus, the government could pay the community 
organization a transfer of t = c ( )
G G z z 2 1 ,  to undertake the project on its behalf, thereby 
saving money. 
Note, however, that solution is not incentive compatible unless the government 
has some direct way of controlling the community organization’s inclination to change 
the program’s objectives ex post facto. This is because preferences over project 




Thus, if it were given a transfer of  ( )
G G z z c 2 1 ,  to undertake the project, the community 
organization would be  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) {} . , , , 2 1 2 2 1 1
G G G G z z c z z z c z  
This would be the solution under community management if it were not possible 
for the government to write some kind of contract that restrained the community’s 
behavior. Thus, we are assuming an extreme form of contractual incompleteness in the 
model. This seems pragmatically reasonable in a world where the objectives of poverty 
alleviation programs are very hard to describe ex ante. 
When, in this world, would the government wish to decentralize management of 
poor support to the community organization? Let  
 
() () ( ) {} , , max arg 2 1 y y z y z G y
C C G − =  
 
as the optimal poverty alleviation budget to grant to a community, given that the resource 
allocation decision will be made at the community level. Then the government will prefer 
to have a community organization manage a poverty alleviation project if 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). , , , 2 1 2 1 2 1
G G G G G G C G C z z C z z G y y z y z G − > −  
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≥ ≥62 
The left-hand side is the payoff of the government if it gives a budget of y
G to the 
community and the right-hand side is the payoff to the government under pure 
government provision. In general, it is easy to see that the likelihood of community 
involvement is highest where (1) government and community preferences are more 
congruent and (2) the absolute cost advantage of the community is largest. It is not clear a 
priori whether the budget is larger or smaller under community management—this 
depends on the nature of the agency problem involved and how budget sensitive are the 
different objectives. If the government receives a negative private benefit from pursuing 
one of the objectives of the program, then it may respond to the agency problem by 
cutting the budget below the cost of doing the project itself. It could still be optimal for 
the government to have the community organization undertake the project if there were a 
distinct cost advantage involved on the other poverty objective. 
The community organization has also to be willing to undertake management of 
the project—it is only natural to assume that it will not be foisted on an unwilling 
organization. This requires that  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). , , 2 1 2 1
G G G C G C z z R y z y z R ≥  
 
Now consider the well being of the poor. Most of the discussion of poverty 
reduction tends to assume that the community organizations are more in tune with the 
preferences of the beneficiaries. If the community cares solely about the beneficiaries, 
then whenever community management is good for the poor, it will be chosen by the 
community. However, if there is an agency problem, in the sense that the well being of 
the poor and the community organization are not fully in tune, there is no guarantee that 
this will be the case. 
 
Example: Suppose that the only difference in preferences is which group to target 
resources on. Thus, let b (zi) be utility of members of group i when the aim of the 
antipoverty program is get them to an income of zi. We assume that b (zi) = log (zi). There 63 
are two groups; let λ  be the share of type 1s in the population. The overall benefit 
indicator of the poor is  ()( ) () . log 1 2 1 z z b λ λ − +  The government and the community 
organization differ in the weight that they attach to the well-being of each group. Thus,  
 




where α  ≥  λ  >  β . In other words, the government favors group 2 when it designs the 
program. We assume that there is a transaction cost ci (Ci) for the community 
organization (government) to reach group i and the initial (pre-transfer) income for group 
i is the same and fixed at y. Then the cost of achieving the objective is 
 
() () () Γ + − + ≡ − + + − − + 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 z z C C y z z λ λ λ λ λ λ  
 
if the government manages the project, and 
 
() () () γ λ λ λ λ λ λ + − + ≡ − + − − − + 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 z z c c y z z  
 




















β G G z z  
 
It is also easy to check that 
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and that  . 1 γ + =
G y  So in this case, the unconstrained community optimum and the 
constrained optimum yield the same allocation. The community organization spends 
more on the group that it favors relative to the government. The two conditions for 
community participation to be optimal are 
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The latter is clearly satisfied. The former will be satisfied when Γ is much larger than γ  
and α  is closer to β . Whether the poor’s benefit goes up or down depends upon whether 
 















































This will tend to be the case of α  is closer to λ  than is β , i.e., there is less of an agency 
problem with community organizations. 
The empirical implications of the model are fairly straightforward: (1) we should 
expect to see an empirical difference between programs that are community managed and 
those that purely government run, and (2) there is no direct link between the cost of 
delivering benefits in a program and whether a program is community run. We could 
easily find community-managed programs that have more or less cost per unit in 
equilibrium because of changes in objectives. 65 
APPENDIX 2: FULL RESULTS OF TABLES 7 AND 8 
Table 7a—The impact of de jure participation on the log of the cost of creating one 
day of employment 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






With no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -0.313 
(0.377) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -1.132 
(1.000) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.19 
F statistic on all regressors  -  10.96**  13.31** 
Sample size  99  99  99 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 66 
Table 7b—The impact of de jure participation on the cost of transferring one rand 
to a poor person  
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  5.177 
(0.680) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -9.098 
(0.957) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.37 
F statistic on all regressors    3.15**  2.62** 
Sample size  99  99  99 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 7c—The impact of de jure participation on the log of the level of cost 
overruns 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -627.574 
(0.821) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  536.485 
(1.262) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.21 
F statistic on all regressors    0.91  1.18 
Sample size  85  85  85 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 7d—The impact of de jure participation on the percentage of project costs 
that are paid out as wages  
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.058 
(0.208) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.095 
(0.273) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.91 
F statistic on all regressors  -  10.84**  9.02** 
Sample size  99  99  99 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 7e—The impact of de jure participation on the ratio of training days to days 
of employment  
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -3.074 
(0.128) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -17.689 
(0.658) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.59 
F statistic on all regressors  -  5.08**  3.45** 
Sample size  99  99  99 
Notes: * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results of 
estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are OLS 
estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 7f—The impact of de jure participation on the ratio of project wages to local, 
unskilled wages 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.178 
(0.692) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.259 
(1.051) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.13 
F statistic on all regressors  -  11.66**  8.52** 
Sample size  99  99  99 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 7g—The impact of de jure participation on the ratio of percentage of 
employment days to women  
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  46.145 
(1.766)* 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  19.861 
(0.660) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  2.54* 
F statistic on all regressors  -  9.28**  8.14** 
Sample size  99  99  99 
Notes: * = significant at the 10  percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8a—The impact of de facto participation on the log of the cost of creating one 
day of employment 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  0.029 
(0.488) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -0.264 
(0.320) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -1.725 
(1.352) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.86 
F statistic on all regressors  -  9.42**  12.26** 
Sample size  97  97  97 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8b—The impact of de facto participation on the cost of transferring one rand 
to a poor person 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  0.748 
(1.474) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  3.398 
(0.464) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -16.676 
(1.608) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.91 
F statistic on all regressors    1.73  2.32** 
Sample size  97  97  97 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8c—The impact of de facto participation on the log of the level of cost 
overruns 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  0.278 
(0.015) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  -550.673 
(0.651) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  712.812 
(1.409) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.19 
F statistic on all regressors    1.31  1.16 
Sample size  83  83  83 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8d—The impact of de facto participation on the percentage of project costs 
that are paid out as wages  
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  0.007 
(0.458) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.049 
(0.176) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.254 
(0.678) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.84 
F statistic on all regressors  -  9.34**  7.16** 
Sample size  97  97  97 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8e—The impact of de facto participation on the ratio of training days to days 
of employment 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  -0.114 
(0.113) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  3.973 
(0.156) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  -19.645 
(0.653) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  0.30 
F statistic on all regressors  -  4.68**  3.06** 
Sample size  97  97  97 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8f—The impact of de facto participation on the ratio of project wages to local, 
unskilled wages 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






with no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  0.024 
(1.771)* 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  0.157 
(0.584) 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  0.119 
(0.437) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.60 
F statistic on all regressors  -  12.25**  8.55** 
Sample size  97  97  97 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
OLS estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
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Table 8g—The impact of de facto participation on the ratio of percentage of 
employment days to women  
  (1) (2)  (3) 






With no selectivity 
control, instruments for 
participation included 










































Divorced -  -  -0.922 
(0.411) 
Index of racial fractionalization  -  -  44.063 
(1.781)* 
Index of political fractionalization  -  -  28.619 
(0.907) 





F statistic on instruments  -  -  1.94 
F statistic on all regressors  -  9.43**  7.75** 
Sample size  97  97  97 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level. Specification (1) shows the results 
of estimating a treatments effects model using the Heckman two-step estimator. Specifications (2) and (3) are 
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